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The Canadian system of equalization is designed to address di¤erences in revenue-
raising capacity across provinces, basing a province’s entitlements on its actual tax
bases. However, since it does so on a year-on-year basis, the standard against which
a given province’s equalization entitlements are calculated ‡uctuates from year to
year with all provinces’ tax bases and tax rates. The consequence is that, while the
redistribution function is ful…lled annually, the stability of provincial revenues su¤ers.
The evidence we present indicates that, at least for the three revenue categories we
examine, the equalization system can actually be destabilizing, thereby imposing on
provinces variability in their potential revenue streams that exceeds what would exist
in the absence of equalization.
Key words: intergovernmental transfers, equalization, stabilization, interregional
redistribution
JEL Classi…cation: H771 Introduction
In Canada, as in most federations, uneven …scal capacities of provincial governments
are partially o¤set by the system of federal-provincial equalization transfers. The size
of these transfers is determined through a formula that arti…cially links provincial
tax bases and thereby allows provincial governments to share ‡uctuations in each of
their individual tax bases. Equalization payments in Canada are unconditional grants
from the federal government to those provinces — the so-called ‘have-not’ provinces
— whose tax capacities are below a national norm. Speci…cally, entitlement to equal-
ization is based on the di¤erences between each of a province’s per capita tax bases
and the average per capita tax base of …ve ‘standard’ provinces (Quebec, Ontario,
Manitoba, Saskatchewan, andBritishColumbia). The di¤erences arecalculatedfor33
revenue categories, multiplied by the average tax rates in all provinces, and summed
up to yield the overall entitlement. The per capita entitlement for province k in year




















t is the national average provincial tax rate for tax base j in year t, b
j
St
is the per capita tax base j among the …ve standard provinces in year t, and b
j
kt
is the per capita tax base j in province k in year t. Equalization entitlements are
calculatedannually andare …nancedout offederal general revenues raised throughout
the country.
As is evident from the formula, the equalization system is designed as a redistri-
bution scheme by compensating for di¤erences in provincial per capita tax bases to
equalize tax capacities comprehensively for the have-not provinces. As a by-product
of this intermediation, short-run ‡uctuations in a province’s tax bases are also shared
by other provinces. As noted in Boothe (2002), it has generally been perceived that
the equalization program contributes to enhanced stability of provincial revenues.
However, unlike in some federations, equalization entitlements do not depend on
…xed standards, but on the standards (¿j and b
j
S) calculated from actual revenues
and bases of individual provinces in a given year. If these variables were stable over
time, changes in a recipient province’s tax bases would be perfectly o¤set by those
in its entitlements. But they do vary over time, and as a result recipient provinces
are subject to shocks in their equalization transfers because of changes in policies
and bases in other jurisdictions. It is then possible that equalization could actually
be destabilizing, rather than stabilizing, from a recipient’s perspective. The main
purpose of this paper is to examine whether the equalization system is destabilizing,
and if so, to identify the sources of the instability. By destabilizing we mean that
equalization transfers increase the variability of a recipient province’s revenue-raising
capacity. This will be made more precise in what follows.
1There is a growing empirical literature on the stabilizing and redistributive per-
formance of …scal transfers. Our approach contrasts with this literature as follows.
First, while the literature discusses the issues in terms of per capita regional income
(Bayoumi and Masson 1995, Asdrubali et al. 1996, von Hagen and Hepp 2000, Mélitz
and Zumer 2002, and Decressin 2002), we focus on provincial tax collections. That is
because the equalization system is emphatically not meant to be one that addresses
di¤erences in individual incomes. Its purpose is to equalize the ability of provinces
to provide comparable levels of public services. Put di¤erently, it is intended to
address issues of horizontal equity, not vertical equity (Boadway and Hobson 1993,
1998). As such, the targeted variables in the Canadian system are the revenues of the
provinces, not the incomes of individual citizens within a province. The redistribu-
tive function involves equalizing revenue-raising capacities across provinces, and the
stabilization function involves providing provinces with more stable and predictable
‡ows of revenues than those generated from their own sources.
Second, we set aside the redistribution function and concentrate mainly on the
stabilization features of equalization. The former has been a major issue in the lit-
erature, but evaluating the redistribution performance of equalization is of limited
concern in the Canadian case. That is because the design of the equalization system
itself (along with other components of the …scal transfer system) is based on a for-
mula that ensures that tax capacities are comprehensively equalized for the have-not
provinces. Thus, the adequacy of the equalization system in addressing the redis-
tribution function is not in question, although there may well be debates about the
normative case for such a function, and the extent to which it should be pursued
(Usher 1995). There is as well a conceptual problem with taking the standard ap-
proach to estimating the redistributive impact of equalization on personal incomes.
One would have to take account both of the equalization transfers paid by the federal
government, and the source of general revenues used to …nance the scheme. By fo-
cusing on provincial government revenues, this kind of individual income accounting
is not necessary.
Third, while previous studies analyze aggregate intergovernmental transfers and
regional income levels, we directly examine the behaviour ofcomponents of the equal-
ization formula itself. The typical approach in the literature is to employ indirect
methods by examining the value of key coe¢cients from either regression equations
theoretically derived from intertemporal consumption theory (Asdrubali et al. 1996),
or adhoc regression equations that relate pre- andpost-transfer values of the targeted
variables (Bayoumi and Masson 1995, von Hagen and Hepp 2000, Mélitz and Zumer
2002, and Decressin 2002). Our approach is to decompose annual changes in per
capita equalization entitlement into those due to annual changes in the three com-
ponents in the formula, namely the average tax rate (¿j), the …ve-province standard
(b
j
S) and the own per capita base (b
j
k). This enables us to trace the source of changes
in entitlements to these three components, and to evaluate the extent to which the
system has, or has not been, stabilizing.
2Our analysis focuses on three revenue sources in the equalization system — per-
sonal income, business income and sales — which together represent a substantial
proportion of the transfers. To summarize our main results, we show that in at-
tempting to achieve redistribution on a year-by-year basis, the system sacri…ces its
stabilization role. At least for these three revenue categories, equalization transfers
are actually destabilizing, and that is due to fact that a recipient province’s entitle-
ment depends on changes in the …ve-province standard base and the national average
tax as well as changes in its own base. Especially the …rst of these exhibits large
enough volatility to cause the system as a whole to be destabilizing.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss our data source
and take a preliminary look at the stabilization properties by examining correlation
coe¢cients and variance ratios with the relevant data. We then decompose changes
in equalization entitlements into the three components mentioned above and discuss
the implications. Following that, we estimate the parts of tax base changes in each
province that are due to di¤erent types of shocks and calculate how the equalization
system responded to them. Finally, we o¤er some conclusions.
2 Preliminary Analysis
2.1 Data
The data we use are obtained from Finance Canada. They include the raw data used
to calculate annual equalization entitlements for all provinces and revenue sources
from 1967-98. These data include bases and revenues obtained from all 33 revenue
sources used in the representative tax system and for all ten provinces, as well as
provincial populations nkt.1 These data are su¢cient to compute for each revenue
source, per capita tax bases b
j
kt, national average tax rates ¿
j
t (the sum of provincial
revenues divided by the sum of provincial tax bases), and the …ve-province standard
per capita tax bases b
j
St (the sum of the tax bases in the …ve standard provinces
divided by the sum of their populations).2
In using these data, three caveats should be born in mind. First, our analysis
1Note that, while the provincial revenues are those actually collected in each provinces, the tax
bases do not re‡ect those used by the provinces. Instead, a standardized de…nition of the tax base
is used so that meaningful di¤erences between provinces can be used as the basis for entitlements.
2It should be noted that the actual calculation of equalization entitlements for the personal
income tax is somewhat more complicated than depicted in (1) above. In fact, the personal income
category is e¤ectively divided into several income classes with a separate national average tax rate
applicable to each. The data provided by Finance Canada in the equalization tables include shares






it, not their actual levels nktb
j
kt. And these are not
disaggregated by income class. In our exercise, we treat the income tax as a single aggregate base.
To obtain provincial bases, we simply multiply the provincial shares by the ten-province aggregate
base. The latter — Basic Federal Tax to which provincial tax rates apply — was also obtained from
Finance Canada.
3is based on changes in entitlements for selected revenue categories, not those based
on the entire 33 revenue categories. The categories we chose are ‘personal income’,
‘business income’ and ‘sales’. This is because our analysis requires categories that
apply throughout the period of analysis, and those three are amongthe fewthat meet
this condition. The qualitative implications should not be that di¤erent from when
all of the 33 tax bases are considered, since the entitlements based on those selected
categories constitute a substantial portion of the total payments.3 Moreover, these
three bases span the range of those that might be expected to be relatively variable
(business income taxes) to those that are more stable (sales taxes).
Second, the current formula is used to calculate the entitlements for the entire
sample years. Prior to 1982, the equalization formula was somewhat di¤erent. For
example, a ten-province standard was in e¤ect rather than the present …ve-province
one. The results for pre-1982 years are interpreted as counter-factual cases that show
what the responses would have been if the current formula had been applied. One
might object that this causes problems to the extent that the tax bases and tax rates
might themselves have been di¤erent had a di¤erent equalization formula been in
e¤ect. However, we are interested in the evaluation of the current formula, not that
ofthe past. Consistently using the current formulaallows us to drawmore meaningful
comparisons than using di¤erent historical formulae over the same period.
Third, the data we use to calculate the entitlements are …nal …gures, while the
annual volumes of the transfers initially paid are based upon preliminary estimates.
The di¤erence between the preliminary and …nal …gures are adjusted, but the cal-
culation of the …nal …gures takes a few years to complete. As such, our analysis is
applied to the due amounts that the equalization formula is supposed to deliver. It
is not clear in principle whether these …nal …gures are more or less volatile than the
initial estimates. In any case, we expect that the di¤erences between the two are not
large enough to change our qualitative conclusions.
Our analysis is relevant only for transfer-receiving provinces since the equalization
program is a gross scheme whererevenues are kept intact for provinces witha negative
overall entitlement. The group of recipient provinces is unchanged for the entire
period of our analysis, namely, Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia,
New Brunswick, Quebec, Manitoba and Saskatchewan. Excluding the remaining
three provinces – Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia – from our analysis allows
us to dispense with the original formula (1) and instead to express the per capita























3In 1998-99, the three bases account for about 60% of the total entitlement for the receiving
provinces.
4Recall thatfor our purposes, j indexes the threerevenuecategories of personal income,
business income and sales. The average tax rates ¿
j
t and the …ve-province per capita
bases b
j





















kt is per capita revenues, P denotes the set of all ten provinces and S refers to














kt¡1. Note that, since we do not explicitly consider price changes,
we net out changes in prices by dividing the per capita tax bases and revenues by the
1992 GDP de‡ator.
2.2 Correlations
To take a preliminary look at the possibility that the equalization system is destabiliz-
ing, let us …rst examine howannual changes ineachprovince’s per capita equalization
entitlements respond to changes in its per capita revenues and bases, simply by look-
ing at correlation coe¢cients between the relevant variables for the seven provinces
during 1968–98. The coe¢cients are calculated both for changes in the total entitle-
ments given by (2) and for changes in each of the three category-speci…c entitlements
(3). To the extent that equalization is intended to compensate for a loss in provincial
tax revenues or bases, we would expect these coe¢cients to be negative.
– Table 1 –
Table 1 shows the correlation coe¢cients between annual changes in per capita
equalization entitlements and those in per capita revenues for the seven equalization
receiving provinces, along with P values (in parentheses) which indicate two-tailed?
marginal statistical signi…cance. The coe¢cients are calculated for the aggregate as
well as eachof all threerevenue sources. Contrary towhat might initially be expected,
all correlation coe¢cients take on positive values for the aggregate measures, and are
statistically signi…cant at the :10 level for all provinces except Newfoundland and
Quebec. The results for each of the three revenue sources corroborate those obtained
in the aggregate, albeit with some di¤erences among the three. The coe¢cients
are found to be positive in almost all the cases, though several are not signi…cant,
especially inthe category of sales. The fewnegatives ones (Saskatchewanfor personal
income, andQuebec and Saskatchewanfor sales) are small invalue and not signi…cant
at the :10 level. This tendency for a positive correlation, which mirrors that found by
5Boothe (2002), may come as a surprise. It would imply that, contrary to its intent,
the equalization system is actually destabilizing, at least with respect to revenue
sources.
This …nding is, however, premature. Tax revenues are to some extent a¤ected
by the tax policies of the provincial governments, so the correlation could re‡ect
the e¤ect of policy changes. The equalization system is intended to compensate for
changes in the potential to raise revenues rather than the actual revenues themselves.
A more relevant correlation might be that between equalization entitlements and a
province’s revenue-raising capacity. Following the procedure used in the equalization
system itself, we employ the per capita tax base evaluated at the national average tax
rate as a province’s tax capacity from a given base. Although this measure might still
be in‡uenced by provincial tax policies, it presumably more closely re‡ects revenue-
raising potential than do actual tax revenues.
– Table 2 –
Table 2 then shows the correlation coe¢cients between annual changes in per













t¡1)=2.4 Given (1), we would expect this correlation to be negative,
more so than for the per capita tax revenues. The results, however, are mixed. For
the three revenue sources taken in aggregate, negative correlations apply for three
provinces — New Brunswick, Manitoba and Saskatchewan — but only the last is sta-
tistically signi…cant at the :10 level. The correlations are positive for Newfoundland,
Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and Quebec, and signi…cantly so for Newfound-
land and Nova Scotia.
The destabilizing tendency also varies over the three revenue sources as the last
three columns of Table 2 indicate. For personal income, …ve provinces (Newfound-
land, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Quebec) exhibit posi-
tive correlations, two of which are signi…cant at the :10 level (Nova Scotia and New
Brunswick). The remaining two (Manitoba and Saskatchewan) have negative corre-
lations that are also statistically signi…cant. For business income, Newfoundland and
Manitoba exhibit positive signs but are not signi…cant. Among the other …ve with
negative correlations, three are statistically signi…cant (Prince Edward Island, New
Brunswick and Saskatchewan). For sales, the correlations are negative for all cases,
signi…cantly so for Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Saskatchewan. The implication
seems to be that equalization with respect to sales is somewhat more stabilizing than
with respect to the income tax bases, especially personal income.
4The tax rates for the changes from t ¡ 1 to t are given as the average values of them in t ¡ 1






t¡1)=2) will also be used in Section 3.
62.3 Response Patterns
While the correlation coe¢cient is a useful indicator of the extent to which changes in
the entitlements and those in the actual or potential revenues in the same direction,
it is of limited value for indicating the extent to which equalization entitlements
are actually destabilizing. That is because the correlation coe¢cient only shows the
tendency for two variables to move in tandem, not the relative magnitudes of their
changes. For example, let ½ be the correlation coe¢cient between changes in the
entitlements de and those in the actual or potential revenues dr, and hypothetically
assume that the following linear relation holds: de = ® ¢ dr so the variables are
perfectly correlated — negatively or positively as ® 7 0. Then, it can be shown
that ½ = ®=j®j. If coe¢cient ® is negative, we obtain ½ = ¡1, regardless of the
magnitude of ®. Yet, clearly the magnitude of ® is relevant: a very small value of ®
would imply that even if ® > 0; so that the system is destabilizing, it would not be
of great concern. By the same token, even if ® < 0; so entitlements o¤set changes
in tax capacity, equalization could be destabilizing if the absolute size of ® is large
enough. Speci…cally, it can be considered to be destabilizing if the absolute value
of the post-equalized revenue change is larger than that of the pre-equalized change,
which will be the case if ® < ¡2.
– Figure 1 –
Such possibilities are revealed in Figure 1, where panels (a) and (b) respectively











kt +¢ekt) for the seven receiving provinces. Noting that the
two panels are presented inthe same scale, the post-equalized changes indeed seem to
be volatile than their the pre-equalized counterparts. To investigate this more closely,







every period under consideration. We classify the following four patterns:
(a) under-o¤setting: equalization entitlements o¤set changes in aggregate tax ca-

















(b) over-o¤setting: the o¤set more than compensates for changes in aggregate tax






































(c) hyper-o¤setting: the o¤set more than compensates for changes in aggregate tax













































7We also examine the four patterns (a)–(d) for each of the three revenue sources
individually by comparing changes in entitlements ¢e
j





Note that patterns (a) and (b) are stabilizing, while (c) and (d) are destabilizing.
– Table 3 –
Table 3 breaks down the 31 annual changes according to the number that fall
into each of the four patterns. The results in the table point dramatically to the
destabilizing properties of the equalization system. For aggregate equalization enti-
tlements in the top part of the table, cases of (d) — where equalization entitlements
increase when a province’s standardized tax revenues increase — account for more
than half of the cases for Quebec and Saskatchewan, almost a half in New Brunswick,
and almost a third of the cases for Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and Manitoba.
Furthermore, most of the cases are destabilizing ones — cases (c)+(d) — with the
lowest frequency of 13/31 for Newfoundland.
Overall, the same patterns apply to all three categories. Speci…cally, the case
of co-movement (d) tends to have the highest frequencies for almost all categories
and provinces. Furthermore, most of the cases are destabilizing ones (c)+(d), with
the lowest frequency being 13/31 for Quebec’s business income. Surprisingly, the
frequency of destabilizing case in business income are not larger than those in the
other two categories. On the contrary, the category of sales tends to exhibit the
highest frequencies of (c) and (c)+(d).
2.4 Variance Ratios
The above results suggest that theequalizationsystem does not contribute tostabiliz-
ing provincial revenues over time, and may even destabilize them for some provinces.
We may pursue this line of argument in a more straightforward manner. The stabi-
lization properties of a federal-provincial transfer system can be evaluated in terms of
the degree to which annual changes in revenues are smoothed in the presence of the
system. Such a smoothing e¤ect may be characterized by comparing the variances of
changes in pre- and post-equalized revenue quantities. If equalization smoothes (i.e.,
stabilizes) changes in provincial revenues, we then expect the variances of annual
changes in post-equalized quantities to be smaller than those of annual changes in
pre-equalized counterparts. If not, we expect the former to be larger than the latter.
Here, we compare post- and pre-equalization variances for both actual revenues and
standardized revenues (tax capacities).5
– Table 4 –
5This strategy was taken by Boothe (2002). However, he uses the pre- and post equalized values
for actual aggregate provincial revenues only.
8Table 4 uses annual changes in actual per capita revenues, and lists the ra-
tios of the variances of the post-equalized quantities to those of their pre-equalized




























. As descriptive statistics, these ratios indeedindicate
that post-equalized revenues are more volatile, withall values of the ratios being more
than unity. When the sub-categories are compared, the ratios are largest for business
income and smallest for sales in most cases. The table also shows P values for the
null hypothesis that the variances are equal before and after equalization. At the :10
level, we reject the hypothesis in a majority of the cases. Especially notable is the the
fact that the hypothesis of equal volatilities is rejected for all the Maritime provinces
except with respect to sales. On the other hand, non-rejections are observed only
with Quebec, Manitoba and Saskatchewan for personal income and with the latter
two for business income, and all except Prince Edward Island for sales. Note that,
while the case of non-rejection does not imply a destabilizing e¤ect, it does not imply
a stabilizing e¤ect either, since the null hypothesis is that of equal volatilities.
– Table 5 –
Table 5 reports the same ratios of variances by using the standardized measure










kt for the aggregate) in place
of the actual per capita revenues. The ratios again indicate that annual changes in
revenues are more volatile after equalization for all except Saskatchewan for personal
income and New Brunswick for business income. The inferential results are quite
similar to those with the actual revenues. Although not de…nite in every case — and
two stabilizing cases are detected (personal income in Saskatchewan and business
income in Quebec)6 — these results in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that the equalization
program tends to destabilize the revenue streams of the recipient provinces, especially
for the two income tax categories.
2.5 Summary
The evidence seems to indicate that for the three revenue sources under consider-
ation, the equalization system tends to be destabilizing. We …nd no …rm evidence
that annual changes in equalization payments are negatively correlated with those of
tax capacities or pre-equalized revenues. And instances of destabilizing changes in
equalization payments are more frequent than those of stabilizing changes. As well,
6For these two cases, the analysis in Section 2.3 indicates frequent occurrence of the destabilizing
case. Recall that that analysis is based on the response patterns in a single period. On the other
hand, the variances use the sum of squared values of deviations from the mean for the whole period
of analysis. It is then possible to obtain at the same time a result that shows a frequent occurrence
of the destabilizing case and a relatively low value of the variance ratio.
9post-equalization variables are more volatile than their pre-equalization counterparts.
In the next two sections, we attempt to identify the sources of the destabilizing ef-
fects. We …rst attribute changes in equalization entitlements to three components
— those due to own base changes, those due to changes in the bases of the …ve rep-
resentative provinces, and those due to changes in the national average tax rates.
After having established that much of the volatility comes from changes in the bases
of all provinces, we then in the subsequent section statistically decompose these into
various types of shocks.
3 Decomposing Changes in Equalization Entitle-
ments
3.1 Decomposition of annual changes
The previous section indicates that provincial entitlements ekt might behave rather









kt are negatively related in the formula for entitlements, this implies that





St. Our next task is to quantify these in‡uences. To do so, we decompose







































































































For discrete changes, we can use a Taylor approximation to obtain the relevant discrete analogue.
Given the multiplicative form of the expression for ek, a second-order Taylor expression will be















kt¡1) . By straightforward alternative rearrangements























































kt¡1. The coe¢cients will di¤er slightly because of the di¤erent time periods used to
value them. Our decomposition in (5) combines these two expressions, and evaluates the change in







t captures the e¤ect of changes in national average tax rates














kt captures the e¤ect of changes in own per capita tax bases. As for the






















To interpret this decomposition in terms of the in‡uence of each of the three
components, we assume that we can treat each of them as independent in the equal-
ization formula. In fact, the national average tax rate ¿j is constructed using the tax
bases of the provinces, so we are ignoring whatever interdependency this causes. This
will be legitimate to the extent that the determination of the national average tax
rate is based on provincial tax rates rather than their bases, which will be the case
when provincial tax rates are proportional.8 In addition, changes in own base for
the recipients that belong to the …ve standard provinces (i.e., Quebec, Manitoba and
Saskatchewan) will to some extent a¤ect changes in the …ve province standard ¢b
j
St.
However, such e¤ects are found to be quantitatively negligible.9 Our decomposition,
therefore, seems like a good …rst approximation.
– Figure 2 –
Panels (a)–(g) in Figure 2 depict graphically the results of the decompositions
calculated using (5) for the seven recipient provinces.10 The solid diamonds showthe
values for ¢ekt during each of the …scal years. As these indicate, there is considerable
variability from one year to the next in per capita entitlements from these three
revenue sources. The vertical bars consist of three segments that show the values for
xkt, yt and zkt. Those components with positive values appear above the horizontal









k sk¿k where nk is population, rk is per capita revenue, ¿k is individual
average tax rate, and sk ´ nkbk=
P
nkbk is tax base share, all for province k. The last expression
illustrates that the tax rate of a province has an in‡uence on the national average tax rate to the
extent of its tax base share. As such, for most have-not provinces with small tax base shares, the
e¤ects of their own tax rate changes on the national average are not likely to be signi…cant. The per
capita tax base may well in‡uence the individual average tax rates as well. However, if provincial
taxes are proportional, then ¿ k is constant and independent of changes in individual per capita tax
bases, which may not be an unreasonable assumption. If this assumption is maintained, we could,
in principle, decompose changes in ¿ =
P
k sk¿ k into that due to the own province’s tax rate changes
and that due to tax base changes (via changes in sk).
9To account for the e¤ect of own bases on the …ve province standards, we rewrite the formula for a
single category as ekt = ¿t[b
¡k
St ¡(1 ¡ wkt) bkt] where wit is a population share and b
¡k
St ´ bSt¡wktbkt.








kt ´ ¡[(1 ¡ wkt)¿ t + (1 ¡ wkt¡1)¿t¡1]=2, ¢wkt ´ wkt ¡ wkt¡1 and Ákt ´
(wktbkt + wkt¡1bkt¡1)=2. However, these results are found to be similar to those in the case in the





















kt, analogous …gures can be made for
each of the three subcategories, which are omitted due to space limitation.
11axis, while those with negative values appear below. Naturally, all three add up to
¢ekt. As can be seen, in most years, there are both negative and positive components
regardless of the sign of ¢ekt. For all seven provinces, the impacts ofthe …ve-province
standards (yt) are relatively large, usually exceeding the impacts of own tax bases
(zkt). The average tax rates (xkt) is the least in‡uential among the three, but it still
exerts substantial impacts in some cases.
Note that the negative of the impacts of own tax bases zkt coincides with changes






kt, that we utilizedinthe previous
section. Since ¢ekt = xkt + yt + zkt, it then follows that the combined e¤ects of the
…ve-province standards and the average tax rates turn out to be changes in the post-






kt + ¢ekt. Therefore, we have in
fact discussed the speci…c patterns of relative magnitudes between xkt + yt and ¡zkt
in Section 2.3, and shall not repeat them here.
3.2 Variance decompositions
We may further characterize the relative in‡uence of these three components of enti-
tlement changes by applying a variance decomposition to ¢ekt = xkt + yt + zkt:
var(¢ekt) = var(xkt)+ var(yt) + var(zkt)
+2¢ cov(xkt;yt)+ 2¢ cov(xkt;zkt)+ 2¢ cov(yt;zkt): (6)









kt. Table 6 list the variance-covariance components for
the aggregate and for each of the revenue categories individually. In each case, the
components arenormalizedbythe varianceofthechangesinentitlements— var(¢ekt)
or var(¢e
j
kt) — so that they add up to unity.11
– Table 6 –
A number of observations followfrom Table 6. First, the results showthatchanges
due to the …ve-province standard base yt ‡uctuate considerably more than those due to
own per capita tax bases zkt. And, inturn, variations in bothof those twocomponents
are signi…cantly larger than those in the national average tax rate xt. At the same
time, the large ‡uctuations of the former two do not materialize fully into changes
in the equalization entitlements since the two components are inversely correlated
to a sizable extent, as indicated by the far right column in the table. We observe
analogous results for each of the individual revenue sources. In each case, changes
due to the …ve-province standard ‡uctuate more than those due to the own per capita
tax base.
11Note that Table 6 is not suitable for cross-revenue comparison since the …gures are normalized
by the variance of changes in the corresponding single revenue category.
12Second, post-equalizedrevenues arefrequentlymore volatilethantheir pre-equalized




















var(xkt + yt) = var(xkt) + var(yt) +2 ¢ cov(xkt;yt)






kt, is var(zkt). The
normalized values of these variances and covariances in Table 6 can then be used
























of the revenue sources, we obtain analogous results for the single category. These
ratios are of course identical to those listed in Table 5. There, we saw that the equal-
ization system results in the variance ratios being more than unity in every case with
two exceptions, but the ratios are smaller for the category of sales.
Third, we …nd that the covariance between yt and zkt is uniformly negative
(cov(y;z) < 0). Given that the negative of zkt is identical to changes in the pre-







St) and those in the tax capacities tend to move in the same direction.
To the extent that the equalization system is intended to insure against changes in
each province’s own tax capacity, we would expect an increase (a decrease) in ekt
to o¤set revenue losses (gains) from own tax base changes. This then suggests the
possibility that revenue losses from own tax base reductions may not be compensated
by a change in equalization payments. The results for the three sub-categories are
once again analogous to those for the aggregates.
4 Responses to Di¤erent Shocks
The analysis of the previous section indicated that the main source of variability
in equalization entitlements comes from changes in tax bases. The possibility of
entitlement changes being destabilizing was attributed mainly to movements in the
…ve-province standard base. These often overwhelmed the stabilizing in‡uence of the
system in response to a province’s own base changes. The fact that the changes in
the …ve-province base are destabilizing suggests that there may be some common
patterns underlying movements in individual provincial tax bases. If provincial tax
basechanges re‡ected province-speci…ceconomic shocks that were independent of one
another, these shocks would be diversi…able so that the equalization system wouldact
as a risk-pooling device over a period of time. That is, equalization should smooth
provincial tax capacities inclusive of equalization. The fact that this does not seem
to occur suggests that there is some common element to the changes in provincial
tax bases which by their nature cannot be pooled. If shocks to per capita tax bases
were common (perfectly correlated), the …ve-province standards would change in
tandem witheachrecipient province’s taxbase soequalizationwouldnotbe stabilizing
13at all. More generally, the …ve-province standard might change in an erratic way
relative to the per capita tax base of a recipient province giving rise to the possibility
of destabilization. This section investigates the source of the destabilizing features
of the tax system by decomposing changes in provincial tax bases into elements
corresponding with di¤erent forms of shocks. To do so, we abstract from changes
in tax rates due to policy decisions and focus entirely on the e¤ects of changes in
individual tax bases over the period.
To give some …rst indication of patterns of shocks to provincial tax bases, panels
(a)–(c) in Figure 3 illustrate annual changes in per capita tax bases as well as the …ve-
province standards respectively for personal income, business income and sales, with
bold lines indicating those for the …ve-province standards. These …gures suggest that
common patterns exist in these annual changes. In addition, they seem to indicate
some autoregressive patterns. Following this suggestion, the analysis that follows
assumes that shocks to provincial tax bases can be of three forms — common with
other provinces, uncorrelated and autocorrelated. We decompose annual changes in
per capita tax bases into the parts that are attributable to these di¤erent types of
shocks, and see how the equalization entitlements respond to each of them.
– Figure 3 –
More speci…cally, let us assume that annual changes in per capita tax bases con-
sist of province-speci…c individual components and nationwide common shocks. The
province-speci…c components are further decomposed into serially correlated individ-
ual changes (s
j
k) and serially independent individual shocks (²kt). Letting ct stand for
the common shocks, we can then express annual changes in the per capita tax base j










Our task is to identify the impacts that each of the three types of components in (7)
have had on the observed changes in equalization entitlements. We proceed in three
steps.
First, we obtain plausible estimates for the three types of changes. For this pur-

































kt¡1 and½j’s are coe¢cients. We perform OLS
estimation on (8) using annual changes in per capita tax bases in the ten provinces
during 1969–98. The panel structure of our data allows us to obtain estimates for the
common shocks (c
j
t) as time-speci…c …xed e¤ects (i.e., coe¢cients on time dummies).
Note that the slope coe¢cients (½
j
k) as well as …xed e¤ects (½
j
k0) are allowed to take on
province-speci…c values withthe use of provincial dummies. From these estimates, we
14obtain the residuals ^ ²
j
it and the time e¤ects ^ c
j
t for each of the three revenue sources.
These can then be used to give us estimates for the three components of (7): (i)
serially correlated individual changes ^ s
j




kt ¡ ^ c
j
t ¡ ^ ²
j
itgi, (ii) serially
uncorrelated individual shocks ^ ²
j
t = f^ ²
j
itgi
12 and (iii) common shocks ^ c
j
t = f^ c
j
tgt for
t = 1969¡ 98.13






t that are caused by each of
the three di¤erent changes in provincial per capita tax bases. Let ^ u
j



















































































Third, by taking advantage of decomposition formula (5), we may obtain the







































A standardized measure for the change in revenue-raising ability caused by a shock





t ¢ ^ u
j
kt:
This constitutes the pre-equalized revenue change. The post-equalized counterpart is




t ¢ ^ u
j
kt + ¢^ ekt:
To characterize the impacts of di¤erent shocks ^ u
j




t and ^ ²
j
kt, we simply





t ¢ ^ u
j
kt) — the correlation coe¢cient between changes in tax capaci-
ties due to shocks and corresponding responses of equalization entitlements, and (ii)
12Note that the values for ^ ²
j
it are calculated so as to add up to zero both cross-sectionally and
serially (
P
i2P ^ ²it = 0 and
P
t^ ²it = 0).




t) are not consistent. In this sense,
the three estimates for the components of (7) are not preferable in the statistical sense. However,
this should not be a problem here, since we regard this exercise as a numerical simulation based
upon some given set plausible values. We therefore do not list the details of the estimation results,











t ¢ ^ u
j
kt) — the ratio of the variance of post-equalized
revenue changes to that of pre-equalized revenue changes. Also, as in Section 3, we
examine frequencies of speci…c patterns of entitlement changes for 1969–98. We list
the correlation coe¢cients and the variance ratios in Table 7, and the patterns of per
capita entitlement responses in Table 8, respectively for serially correlated individual
changes, serially uncorrelated individual shocks, and common shocks.
– Tables 7 and 8 –
The correlation coe¢cients for the serially correlated individual changes (^ s
j
kt) are
all negative and statistically signi…cant, which implies an o¤setting relation. On
the other hand, the destabilizing properties seem to be retained. Except for Prince
Edward Island, all the variance ratios are more than one, although only those for
Newfoundland and Quebec are statistically signi…cant at the :10 level. The response
pattern con…rms the destabilizing tendency since about two-third of the cases are
destabilizing for every receiving province. By construction, the serially correlated
individual changes retain the dynamic properties, since they are actual tax base
changes net of the serially uncorrelated and common shocks. We may then argue
that the destabilization properties demonstrated in the previous sections are partly
due to these dynamic properties of the tax bases. However, the signi…cantly negative
correlations somewhat contradict what we …nd in Table 2 for most of the provinces.
This should be related to the present calculation procedures given in (9). Note that
the changes in the entitlements are calculated with population and provincial average
tax rates that are …xed at their previous year’s values. As such, we expect them to
be less volatile than otherwise.
The responses to the serially uncorrelated individual shocks (^ ²
j
kt) are di¤erent
except that the correlations are again all negative and signi…cant. The variance ra-
tios are all below unity except for Nova Scotia. In addition, the reduced variances
are signi…cant for New Brunswick, Manitoba and Saskatchewan. Furthermore, the
frequencies of the destabilizing cases are reduced to about one half of the cases for
all recipients. Notably, compared with the case for the serially correlated changes,
the frequencies of co-movement are almost halved in all but Nova Scotia. Notice,
however, that statistically signi…cant reductions in the variances are only found for
New Brunswick, Manitoba and Saskatchewan. For the others, we do not reject the
hypothesis of no changes in volatility. This, along with the fact that there are still
substantive cases of destabilization, indicates that the scheme cannot pool the seri-
ally uncorrelated individual shocks as well as we may have expected, although it does
better than the case with the serially correlated counterparts. This result may be
due to the facts that the shocks are de…ned on per capita basis and that the standard
base is based upon the subset of the federation members. While the estimated per
capita shocks add up to zero cross-sectionally (
P
i2P ^ ²it = 0), population-weighted




it 6= 0), which implies that aggregated shocks are
not symmetric. In addition, the equalization standards do not fully account for the
16aggregated shocks, since their changes only re‡ect those in the …ve standard provinces P
i2S nit¡1^ ²
j













kt are o¤setting on average since the correlations are negative.






= 0 does not hold, its value does not fre-
quently co-move with that of ^ ²
j
kt, which may still have something to do with the fact
that, albeit in per capita term, the shocks are estimated such that
P
i2P ^ ²it = 0.
Morever, we hardly expect full risk-pooling to apply in practice since the law of large
number will not operate in a federation of only ten provinces.
The results for common shocks (c
j
t) are quite similar across the seven provinces.
This is due to the fact that, if ^ uit = ^ ct, the changes in the entitlement is given as




kt¢¿ (^ ct). That is, changes in the entitlements are entirely induced
by those in the average tax rates. While we expect the magnitude of these changes
to be relatively small based upon the analysis in the previous section, we do not
exclude the possibility of a destabilizing outcome. In fact, destabilizing patterns





kt¢¿ (^ ct), the frequencies of destabilizing cases are less than those
with the other two types of shocks, and all of the destabilizing cases are those of
co-movement: none are hyper-o¤setting cases. Otherwise, the common shocks seems
to be well accounted for. The correlation coe¢cients are all negative and signi…cant.
Likewise, the variance ratios are also all less than unity and signi…cant. This may
seem to be odd at …rst glance since one might expect that a system of cross-region
transfers can only pool region-speci…c shocks. But, since the equalization program is
a ‘gross’ scheme rather than a ‘net’ one, this result should not be a surprise. That
is, the scheme can pool common shocks a¤ecting recipient provinces at the expense
of changes in the federal budget.
5 Concluding Remarks
The Canadian constitution commits the federal government to the ‘principle of mak-
ing equalization payments to ensure that provincial governments have su¢cient rev-
enues to provide reasonably comparable levels ofpublic services at reasonably compa-
rable levels of taxation’. This admonition is consistent with the economic arguments
for equalizationthat originatedin theclassic contributions by Buchanan (1950, 1952),
and that weredevelopedwiththeCanadian case in mindby Graham (1964) and Boad-
way and Flatters (1982). The core argument is that in a decentralized federation,
comparable citizens residing in di¤erent provinces would receive di¤erent ‘net …scal
bene…ts’ (NFBs) from their respective provincial governments. These di¤erences in
NFBs would provide an incentive for ine¢cient …scally induced migration between
provinces, and would also result in a violation of horizontal equity across provinces.
Theremedy calls forequalizationpayments among provinces too¤set thesedi¤erences
in NFBs. In certain stylized circumstances (e.g., provincial tax rates on residents are
17roughly proportional to incomes, while bene…ts of provincial public services are in-
dependent of income), full equalization of revenue-raising capacity is optimal.14 The
Canadian system of equalization is designed to address di¤erences in revenue-raising
capacity across provinces. That is, it focuses entirely on the redistributive function
of equalization.
Consistent with that objective of erasing NFB di¤erentials, the equalization sys-
tem bases entitlements on actual provincial tax rates and bases. But, because it does
so on a year-on-year basis, the standard against which a given province’s equalization
entitlements are calculated ‡uctuates from year to year as all provinces’ tax bases and
tax rates do. The consequence is that, while the redistribution function is ful…lled
annually, the stabilization function su¤ers. The evidence we have presented in this
paper indicates that, at least for the three major revenue categories we study, the
equalization system can actually be destabilizing, thereby imposing on equalization-
receiving provinces variability in their revenue streams that exceeds what would exist
in the absence of equalization.
To restore the stabilization function of equalization, there must be some persis-
tence in the standard used to calculate each province’s entitlement. If the standard is
stable, the system should succeed in sharing the risks arising from independent asym-
metric shocks to the province’s own base. There are two ways that the standard could
be made less variable. One is for the federal government to use something other than
an aggregate of actual provincial outcomes to set the standard. This might be unsat-
isfactory for two reasons. First, it would imply that equalization entitlements did not
re‡ect actual di¤erences in NFBs, which is the purpose of the equalization system in
principle. Second, if the federal government is given discretion for setting the equal-
ization standard, it opens the possibility that standard becomes part of the annual
budgetary policy of the federal government, which itself can lead to unpredictability
and uncertainty on the part of the provinces. An alternative approach might be to
retain the use of actual provincial tax rates and bases to determine the standard, but
to smooth out ‡uctuations in entitlements by some method of averaging over time.
Thus, payments might be based not on currently calculated national standards, but
on some moving average of past national standards. Such a procedure could retain
the important redistributive function of equalization while at the same time allowing
it to ful…l a stabilization role. An interesting topic for future research might be to
examine if this is the case by following the methodology in this paper with a speci…c
formula that incorporates such a moving average in place of the current formula.
14Moreover, to the extent that provincial public services are targetted to particular types of
persons (the elderly, the ill, the young, etc.), equalization ought to compensate for di¤erences across
provinces in the proportions of persons of these di¤erent types, referred to as di¤erences in need.
The Canadian equalization system, unlike that in many other federations, is based solely on revenue
equalization.
18References
Asdrubali, P., Sorensen, B.E., Yosha, O., 1996. Channels of interstaterisksharing: United
States 1963–1990. Quarterly Journal of Economics 111(4), 1081–1110.
Boadway, R., Flatters, F., 1979. E¢ciency and equalization payments in a federal system
of government: A synthesis and extension of recent results. Canadian Journal of
Economics 15, 613-633.
Boadway, R., Hobson, P., 1993. Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Canada (Canadian
Tax Foundation, Toronto).
Boadway, R., Hobson, P., Eds. 1998. Equalization: Its Contribution to Canada’s Eco-
nomic and Fiscal Progress (Policy Forum Series 36, John Deutsch Institute for the
Study of Economic Policy, Queen’s University, Kingston).
Bayoumi, T., Masson, P.R., 1995. Fiscal ‡ows in the United States and Canada: Lessons
for monetary union in Europe. European Economic Review 39, 253-74.
Boothe, P., 2002. The stabilization properties of Canada’s equalization program. Pa-
per presetnted at the 58th Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance
(Helsinki, Finland, August 2002).
Buchanan, J.M., 1950. Federalism and …scal equity. American Economic Review 40,
583-599.
Buchanan, J.M., 1952. Federal grants and resource allocation. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 60, 208-217.
Decressin, J., 2002. Regional income redistribution and risk sharing: how does Italy
compare in Europe? Journal of Public Economics 86(2), 287-306.
Graham, J.F., 1964. Fiscal adjustment in a federal country. in Intergovernmental Fiscal
Arragnement (Canadian Tax Foundation, Toronto).
Hobson, P., 1998. Is there too much revenueredistribution through Canada’s …scal equal-
ization program? in: Boadway and Hobson (1998).
Konrad, K., Seitz, H., 2001. Fiscal federalism and risksharing in Germany: The role of
size di¤erence. Paper presented at Public Finances and Public Policy in the New
Millennium: A Conference on the Occation of Richard Musgrave’s 90th and CES’s
10th Birthday, University of Munich, 12–13 January 2001.
Mélitz, J., Zumur, F., 2002. Regional redistribution and stabilization by the center in
Canada, France, the UK and the US: A reassessment and new tests. Journal of
Public Economics 86(2), 263-286.
19Usher, D., 1995. The Uneasy Case for Equalization Payments (The Fraser Institute,
Vancouver).
von Hagen, J., Hammond, G.W., 1998. Regional insurance against asymmetric shocks:
An empirical study for the European Community. Manchester School 66(3), 331-53.
von Hagen, J.V., Hepp, R., 2000. Regional risksharing and redistribution in the German
Federation. ZEI, University of Bonn. Unpublished paper.
20Aggregate Personal Business Sales
N‡d. :179 (:328) :240 (:181) :441¤ (:006) :336¤ (:050)
P.E.I. :563¤ (:000) :450¤ (:005) :632¤ (:000) :174 (:345)
N.S. :392¤ (:018) :389¤ (:020) :644¤ (:000) :129 (:485)
N.B. :358¤ (:035) :444¤ (:006) :552¤ (:000) :200 (:271)
Que. :206 (:257) :115 (:534) :498¤ (:001) ¡:009 (:964)
Man. :294¤ (:093) :426¤ (:009) :200 (:272) :290¤ (:099)
Sask. :296¤ (:091) ¡:112 (:546) :208 (:251) ¡:182 (:318)
Table 1: Correlation coe¢cients with per capita revenues
Note: ‘*’ indicates statistical signi…cance at the .10 level: P-values are in parentheses.
Aggregate Personal Business Sales
N‡d. :417¤ (:011) :086 (:644) :192 (:293) ¡:268 (:130)
P.E.I. :130 (:481) :269 (:128) ¡:309¤ (:076) ¡:236 (:188)
N.S. :402¤ (:015) :371¤ (:028) ¡:089 (:632) ¡:300¤ (:086)
N.B. ¡:201 (:268) :380¤ (:023) ¡:736¤ (:000) ¡:322¤ (:062)
Que. :246 (:168) :263 (:139) ¡:089 (:634) ¡:170 (:352)
Man. ¡:014 (:938) ¡:343¤ (:045) :124 (:501) ¡:040 (:831)
Sask. ¡:442¤ (:006) ¡:539¤ (:000) ¡:381¤ (:023) ¡:398¤ (:016)
Table 2: Correlation coe¢cients with per capita tax capacities
Note: ‘*’ indicates statistical signi…cance at the .10 level: P-values are in parentheses.
21o¤set co-move destabilizing
(a)under (b)over (c)hyper (d) (c)+(d)
Aggregate N‡d. 11=31 7=31 7=31 6=31 13=31
P.E.I. 9=31 3=31 9=31 10=31 19=31
N.S. 9=31 5=31 5=31 12=31 17=31
N.B. 8=31 6=31 2=31 15=31 17=31
Que. 12=31 1=31 2=31 16=31 18=31
Man. 14=31 2=31 2=31 13=31 15=31
Sask. 2=31 3=31 3=31 23=31 26=31
Personal N‡d. 8=31 1=31 7=31 15=31 22=31
P.E.I. 5=31 3=31 5=31 18=31 23=31
N.S. 10=31 5=31 3=31 13=31 16=31
N.B. 6=31 7=31 4=31 14=31 18=31
Que. 15=31 3=31 0=31 13=31 13=31
Man. 9=31 4=31 2=31 16=31 18=31
Sask. 4=31 0=31 3=31 24=31 27=31
Business N‡d. 5=31 8=31 5=31 13=31 18=31
P.E.I. 2=31 4=31 8=31 17=31 25=31
N.S. 6=31 6=31 8=31 11=31 19=31
N.B. 9=31 2=31 4=31 16=31 20=31
Que. 12=31 4=31 4=31 11=31 15=31
Man. 14=31 3=31 2=31 12=31 14=31
Sask. 10=31 2=31 1=31 18=31 19=31
Sales N‡d. 7=31 1=31 4=31 19=31 23=31
P.E.I. 5=31 3=31 5=31 18=31 23=31
N.S. 8=31 1=31 2=31 20=31 22=31
N.B. 5=31 1=31 3=31 22=31 25=31
Que. 10=31 0=31 0=31 21=31 21=31
Man. 8=31 1=31 4=31 18=31 22=31
Sask. 5=31 2=31 2=31 22=31 24=31
Table 3: Patterns of responses
Note: The values refer to the number of occurrences out of 31 periods.
22Aggregate Personal Business Sales
N‡d. 1:67¤ (:083) 1:73¤ (:070) 2:87¤ (:003) 1:47 (:150)
P.E.I. 3:00¤ (:002) 2:13¤ (:021) 3:66¤ (:000) 1:72¤ (:073)
N.S. 2:09¤ (:024) 1:66¤ (:087) 2:40¤ (:010) 1:34 (:213)
N.B. 1:85¤ (:048) 1:75¤ (:066) 2:50¤ (:007) 1:38 (:193)
Que. 1:26 (:263) 1:13 (:369) 1:63¤ (:093) 1:06 (:440)
Man. 1:60 (:103) 1:52 (:128) 1:50 (:135) 1:38 (:193)
Sask. 1:46 (:152) 1:26 (:266) 1:10 (:395) 1:09 (:403)
Table 4: Ratios of variances of post- to pre-equalized revenues
Note: ‘*’ indicates statistical signi…cance at the .10 level: P-values are in parentheses.
Aggregate Personal Business Sales
N‡d. 3:72¤ (:000) 2:84¤ (:003) 3:41¤ (:001) 1:49 (:140)
P.E.I. 3:18¤ (:001) 3:92¤ (:000) 1:94¤ (:037) 1:87¤ (:045)
N.S. 2:71¤ (:004) 2:19¤ (:018) 1:95¤ (:036) 1:05 (:444)
N.B. 1:60 (:102) 3:01¤ (:002) 0:49¤a (:026) 1:37 (:198)
Que. 1:43 (:165) 1:48 (:144) 1:12 (:376) 1:00 (:497)
Man. 1:63¤ (:093) 1:09 (:411) 2:30¤ (:013) 1:51 (:134)
Sask. 1:07 (:432) 0:81a (:282) 1:20 (:313) 1:12 (:379)
Table 5: Ratios of variances of post- to pre-equalized tax capacities
Note: ‘*’ indicates statistical signi…cance at the .10 level: P-values are in parentheses.
‘a’ refers to the case where the alternative hypothesis is that the equalization system is
stabilizing.
23var(x) var(y) var(z) 2¢cov(x;y) 2¢cov(x;z) 2¢cov(y;z)
Aggregate N‡d. :23 2:47 :61 ¡:45 :16 ¡2:03
P.E.I. :19 1:93 :55 ¡:38 :03 ¡1:31
N.S. :15 3:07 1:07 ¡:32 :21 ¡3:18
N.B. :11 1:73 1:00 ¡:25 :03 ¡1:63
Que. :07 7:41 4:81 ¡:59 :53 ¡11:23
Man. :07 2:62 1:53 ¡:19 :10 ¡3:12
Sask. :04 1:21 1:10 ¡:08 :11 ¡1:39
Personal N‡d. :64 2:10 :62 ¡:98 :32 ¡1:69
P.E.I. :73 2:24 :47 ¡1:13 :19 ¡1:49
N.S. :65 4:49 1:64 ¡1:56 :66 ¡4:89
N.B. :65 3:15 :85 ¡1:26 :49 ¡2:88
Que. :22 7:25 4:36 ¡1:01 :66 ¡10:48
Man. :13 1:97 1:58 ¡:39 :29 ¡2:59
Sask. :10 1:18 1:37 ¡:17 :22 ¡1:70
Business N‡d. :29 1:75 :53 ¡:22 :08 ¡1:42
P.E.I. :18 1:07 :57 ¡:15 :00 ¡:67
N.S. :23 1:68 :88 ¡:20 :14 ¡1:73
N.B. :06 0:59 1:23 ¡:06 :05 ¡:87
Que. :06 5:71 4:90 ¡:26 :20 ¡9:63
Man. :14 2:25 :95 ¡:19 :11 ¡2:27
Sask. :07 1:35 1:07 ¡:14 :07 ¡1:42
Sales N‡d. :14 1:68 :97 ¡:37 :15 ¡1:55
P.E.I. :14 1:46 :69 ¡:30 :00 ¡:99
N.S. :09 2:46 2:18 ¡:25 :18 ¡3:65
N.B. :05 1:52 :98 ¡:23 :18 ¡1:51
Que. :13 8:82 8:16 ¡:76 :65 ¡16:00
Man. :06 2:99 1:76 ¡:39 :11 ¡3:53
Sask. :02 1:43 1:17 ¡:07 :07 ¡1:54
Table 6: Variance-covariance decompositions
Note: (a) The values are normalized by the variance of annual changes in the entitlements
for each revenue source. (b) x, y and z respectively refers to changes due to those in the
average tax rates, the …ve-province per capita tax bases and own per capita tax bases.
24Correlation Coef. Variance Ratios
Serially correlated N‡d. ¡:716¤ (.000) 1:734¤ (.069)
individual changes P.E.I. ¡:778¤ (.000) :964 (.540)
N.S. ¡:816¤ (.000) 1:157 (.346)
N.B. ¡:763¤ (.000) 1:047 (.451)
Que. ¡:733¤ (.000) 2:882¤ (.002)
Man. ¡:650¤ (.000) 1:604 (.101)
Sask. ¡:745¤ (.000) 1:399 (.181)
Serially uncorrelated N‡d. ¡:804¤ (.000) :840 (.318)
individual shocks P.E.I. ¡:811¤ (.000) :661 (.131)
N.S. ¡:463¤ (.004) 1:309 (.232)
N.B. ¡:858¤ (.000) :566¤ (.062)
Que. ¡:468¤ (.004) :877 (.364)
Man. ¡:810¤ (.000) :554¤ (.055)
Sask. ¡:881¤ (.000) :425¤ (.011)
Common shocks N‡d. ¡:788¤ (.000) :415¤ (.009)
P.E.I. ¡:787¤ (.000) :416¤ (.010)
N.S. ¡:791¤ (.000) :411¤ (.009)
N.B. ¡:789¤ (.000) :413¤ (.009)
Que. ¡:795¤ (.000) :402¤ (.007)
Man. ¡:793¤ (.000) :407¤ (.008)
Sask. ¡:796¤ (.000) :403¤ (.008)
Table 7: Responses to di¤erent shocks: Correlation coe¢cients and vari-
ance ratios
Note: (a) Thevarianceratios aregiven as the variances of post-equalized quantities divided
by those of pre-equalized quantities. (b) ‘*’ indicatesstatistical signi…canceat the .10 level:
P-values are in parentheses.
25o¤set co-move destabilize
(a) (b) (c) (d) (c)+(d)
Serially correlated N‡d. 5=30 6=30 10=30 9=30 19=30
individual changes P.E.I. 5=30 9=30 7=30 9=30 16=30
N.S. 4=30 8=30 5=30 13=30 18=30
N.B. 4=30 8=30 6=30 12=30 18=30
Que. 6=30 6=30 4=30 15=30 19=30
Man. 6=30 6=30 8=30 10=30 18=30
Sask. 3=30 7=30 11=30 9=30 20=30
Serially uncorrelated N‡d. 5=30 12=30 8=30 5=30 13=30
individual shocks P.E.I. 8=30 9=30 5=30 8=30 13=30
N.S. 6=30 7=30 6=30 11=30 17=30
N.B. 6=30 10=30 8=30 6=30 14=30
Que. 11=30 5=30 5=30 9=30 14=30
Man. 10=30 9=30 6=30 5=30 11=30
Sask. 9=30 11=30 6=30 4=30 10=30
Common shocks N‡d. 18=30 2=30 0=30 10=30 10=30
P.E.I. 18=30 2=30 0=30 10=30 10=30
N.S. 18=30 2=30 0=30 10=30 10=30
N.B. 18=30 2=30 0=30 10=30 10=30
Que. 18=30 2=30 0=30 10=30 10=30
Man. 18=30 2=30 0=30 10=30 10=30
Sask. 18=30 2=30 0=30 10=30 10=30
Table 8: Responses to di¤erent shocks: Response patterns
Note: (a)-(d) refer to the number of occurance out of 30 periods.
26 
Figure 1. Annual changes in pre- and post-equalized tax capacities 
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 Figure 3. Changes in per capita tax bases 
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